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micro companies in the UK
Siming Liu
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Abstract
Purpose – Since the UK Companies Act 1981, different reporting standards have developed for different
classes of company to reduce the reporting burden on non-listed companies. There are now different regimes
for listed, large private, medium-sized, small and micro companies. This strategy raises the issue of whether
earnings quality across the different classes of company is comparable. The paper aims to discuss this issue.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the smoothness of earnings to measure reporting
quality across the different types of companies from 2006 to 2013, based on 514,000 observations. Smoothness
is an indicator of poor quality.
Findings – The authors find that listed companies have the highest earnings quality, closely followed by small
and micro companies. In contrast, large private and medium-sized companies havemuch lower earnings quality.
Overall, the authors find companies which switch between reporting regimes have lower earnings quality.
The authors also find that earnings quality is not affected by the small company exemption from audit.
Research limitations/implications – Companies filing abbreviated accounts are excluded since they do
not file an income statement. The recent revisions to UK GAAP (FRS 102 and FRS 105) are not examined due
to insufficient data.
Practical implications – The Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) strategy of reducing the financial
reporting and auditing obligations for small companies seems not to have significantly affected earnings
quality. However, the FRC may need to review the reporting requirements of large private and medium-sized
companies and also the option of companies to switch between reporting regimes; in these settings earnings
quality appears to be weaker.
Originality/value –The paper studies the effect of earnings quality across the different reporting regimes in
the UK. Novel and important features of the study are that the sample covers a wide variety of small and
micro companies which have not been analyzed previously; the results are disaggregated by year, for
assurance that the results are not driven by a single rogue year; and the authors also address the small
company exemption from audit, and the flexibility of non-listed companies to switch between regimes.
Keywords Audit, Earnings quality, Comparability, Switching, Reporting regimes,
SMEs and micro companies
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
One of the key developments in UK financial reporting since the early 1980s has been the
exemption of certain companies from the full reporting requirements applicable to listed
companies. Starting in 1981 with the option for small- and medium-sized companies to
file abbreviated accounts with the Registrar of Companies, followed by small companies
being exempt from audit, there is now a structure in which there is a different set of
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accounting standards for each of the following classes of company: listed; large private and
medium-sized; small; and, finally (as a result of EU Directive 2012/6), micro companies. But
what are the consequences of this multi-tier structure of reporting?
Much of the discussion has been about reducing the cost burden on companies, but little
has been said about the effect on the quality of reporting. This issue is well captured by
Nigel Sleigh-Johnson, the Head of ICAEW’s Financial Reporting Faculty, who said:
Only time will tell whether the reduction in the information required in small company accounts is a
sensible reduction in Red Tape or a source of risk to the UK economy (ICAEW, 2015).
One possible intention of the multi-tier approach may have been to maintain comparability
across the groups whilst reducing reporting costs for smaller companies. In this case, large
companies with more complex operations and more serious agency problems would be
subject to comprehensive standards, whilst smaller companies with relatively simple
operations (and therefore with little opportunity for earnings management) would need less
stringent rules. In contrast, another potential objective may have been that the quality of
reporting should reflect the varying needs of users. In this case, smaller companies would be
less regulated since users’ requirements are relatively modest, and it may be easier to obtain
information outside of the cycle of the annual report and accounts. In this setting, one would
expect the quality of the reporting to be superior for larger companies.
It is important to ascertain the consequences of the relaxation of rules for private
companies since comparability is an important feature of the financial statements of
companies (IASB, 2009, para. BC36; FRC, 2015, para. 2.11; Kim et al., 2016). Indeed, it was the
basis of the dissension by James Leisenring from the International Accounting Standards
Board’s standard for small- and medium-sized entities (IASB, 2009, para. DO3). Prior work
on the differences between different classes of company in the UK is limited. The studies do
not examine very small (micro) companies, which constitute the vast majority. Furthermore,
they examine data of more than ten years ago and, therefore, do not reflect the current
environment in which exemptions for different classes of company are substantial.
We extend this prior work significantly. The first contribution is to compare earnings
quality from 2006 to 2013 for the different classes of company: listed companies that
reported under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS); large private and
medium-sized companies that reported under UK GAAP (FRSs, SSAPs and UITFs); and
small and micro companies that reported under the Financial Reporting Standard for
Smaller Entities (FRSSE). Although these regimes have now been replaced by IFRS, FRS
102 and FRS 105, it will be some time before a large data set is available based on the new
standards. An important feature is to analyse micro companies which are a key focus of the
EU Directive 2013/34; these companies constitute over 40 per cent of our large scale sample
of 514,000 company-year observations. We also provide annual disaggregation so as to
identify the permanence of any differences between company groups. A key finding is that
listed companies have the highest earnings quality, closely followed by small and micro
companies; large private and medium-sized companies have the poorest earnings quality.
The result for listed companies is not surprising since they are required to follow IFRS. Also,
small and micro companies are likely to have relatively straightforward transactions, with
little opportunity for significant earnings management. In contrast, large private and
medium-sized companies are neither required to follow IFRS and may have transactions for
which there is more discretion under UK GAAP.
We also explore other key aspects of themulti-tier reporting regime. One feature is that non-
listed companies are permitted to switch to a reporting regime designed for larger companies
and also to switch back to the regime intended for the companies (the home regime).
For example, small companies were intended to report under FRSSE, but were permitted







































maintains this flexibility. Our second contribution is to examine the effect of this regime
switching. Although switching to a regime intended for a larger company would not seem to
be controversial since the rules are likely to be tighter, switching in either direction may give
rise to comparability issues, both over time and across companies. Furthermore, there is no
study which focusses on this little discussed aspect of the regulation in the UK. Overall, we find
that companies which switch between reporting regimes have lower earnings quality than
those which remain in the home regime.
Another characteristic of the multi-tier reporting regime is that small and micro
companies are exempt from audit. Our third contribution is to assess the effect of this
option. We compare the earnings quality of the companies which exercised this option with
those companies which did not. In contrast to prior research, our sample is large and covers
the full range of small and micro companies for the years 2006-2013, with annual
disaggregation. We find that, with the exception of 2013, the exemption of small and micro
companies from audit does not reduce earnings quality.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the regulatory framework of
the UK multi-tier reporting system. This is followed by a review of the prior literature on the
impact of such a system, thus identifying the issues to be addressed in this study. Section 4
discusses the research method and data which we use. Then follows a discussion of the
results in Section 5, and we conclude with a summary in Section 6.
2. The development of the multi-tier regime
One of the major developments in UK financial reporting over the last few years has been
the emergence of different reporting regimes for different classes of company. It was the
Companies Act 1981 that first defined small- and medium-sized companies and permitted
them to file-modified accounts (subsequently called abbreviated accounts by the Companies
Act 1985) with the Registrar of Companies. Another significant change came in 1994, when
small companies were not required to have an audit. A further relaxation of the reporting
regulations for small companies came about in 1997 when they were allowed to adopt
simpler accounting rules under the FRSSE, for both reporting to shareholders and the
Registrar of Companies (Chopping and Skerratt, 1997). However, they were also permitted to
report under regular UK GAAP if they chose.
At the other end of the company spectrum, in 2005, the EU required listed companies to
follow IFRS, thus leaving unlisted medium-sized and large companies to be covered by a
mix of the UK’s Financial Reporting Standards (FRS), the earlier issued Statements of
Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) and the recommendations of the Urgent Issues Task
force (UITF)[1]. In order to rationalise the reporting rules for these companies which were
neither small nor listed, the Accounting Standards Board[2] took advantage of the
International Accounting Standards Board’s development, in 2009, of its International
Accounting Standard for small- and medium-sized entities (IFRS for SME) and used it as a
base for the development of FRS 102 issued in 2013 to regulate the financial reporting of
medium-sized unlisted entities.
The next important development emanated from EU Directive 2012/6 (European Union,
2012) which gave exemptions from fourth and seventh directives to a new class of company,
the micro company. In response to this, the FRSSE was amended in April 2014. Shortly after
this came EU Directive 2013/34 (European Union, 2013) which combined and amended the
existing fourth and seventh directives with the intention of reducing disproportionate costs
imposed on small companies. The changes were so substantial that, in response, the
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) withdrew the FRSSE, locating the reporting regulations
for micro companies within a new standard (FRS 105) and the regulations for small
companies in a special section of a revised FRS 102. The FRC maintained the option of







































switch back to the home regime if desired. In addition, as allowed under the EU Accounting
Directive, the FRC increased the thresholds for small and medium companies.
Accounting standards are a significant determinant of earnings quality (Soderstrom and
Sun, 2007). Therefore, an important question that arises is whether accounting statements
will be comparable across the different regimes? One rationale for a multi-tier system is that
agency issues and complexity vary across the tiers, the objective of regulation being the
equalisation of earnings quality across the classes of company. Other justifications may
give rise to differences in earnings quality. For example, users’ needs may be different; large
companies typically have complex business operations, suggesting that disclosures need to
be comprehensive, especially when stakeholders may find it difficult to obtain information
outside of the cycle of the annual report and accounts. This situation contrasts with smaller
companies which are likely to be less complex and provide information to stakeholders in a
less formal way. In Section 3, we discuss the prior empirical research which may have some
bearing on the likely effects of the multi-tier regime in the UK. This identifies the gaps in the
literature and leads to the research questions which we address in this study.
3. Prior literature and research questions
3.1 The effect of equity market discipline on earnings quality
Much of the prior literature about earnings quality across different types of company is
concerned with the discipline exerted by equity markets in stifling opportunistic reporting.
However, listing status is only one of the factors which separate UK reporting regimes; the
size of a company also matters. Therefore, the insights to be gained from this literature are
limited, since the studies do not distinguish between different sizes of private company.
Furthermore, in attempting to identify the impact of market discipline, they restrict their
sample to where companies operate under the same reporting regime.
There are three main studies in this category. Beatty et al. (2002) find that during the period
1988-1998, US public banks have superior earnings quality to private banks. However, since
the study relates only to the banking sector, the findings may not have implications for the
current study. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is the only UK study of differential reporting,
investigating the public/private dichotomy for companies facing the same auditing and
reporting requirements during the period 1989-1999. They find that public companies have a
higher earnings quality than private companies. This may suggest that private companies
will also have lower earnings quality when they are under a less restrictive reporting regime.
However, the results have limited implications for the issues here since the measure of quality
used is loss recognition, which is only one aspect of earnings quality, and the sample is now
very dated. Furthermore, although the number of observations of 115,000 firm-years is very
large in statistical terms, a wide range of small and micro companies are excluded.
A more recent study by Givoly et al. (2010) examines the difference between companies
with public equity and those with private equity for the period 1978-2003. The results are
mixed. As in Ball and Shivakumar (2005), they find that public equity companies appear to
be superior in loss recognition tests. However, they also find that public equity companies
undertake more earnings management, and report more opportunistically, than private
companies. This serves to underline that loss recognition tests may not be a good proxy for
more broadly based earnings quality measures.
3.2 Earnings quality across different reporting regimes
A number of other studies allow the reporting regime to vary across the sample, and are
therefore more relevant to the current study. Burgstahler et al. (2006) investigate public
and private companies from 1997 to 2003 across European countries. They find that







































However, the study may not have implications for our current issue for two reasons.
First, the unit of observation is the industry in a particular country, resulting in a maximum
of 269 observations for the tests, which are, therefore, unlikely to capture variations across
companies. Second, the findings are for the aggregate sample, and therefore may be driven
by differences between countries rather than differences across companies within a given
country (e.g. if the ratio of public to private companies is different across countries).
Hope et al. (2013) compares US public and private companies from 2001 to 2009. Their
sample is more representative of the small company sector than in prior US work; the
median of total assets of private companies is $4.27 m compared with $337 m in Givoly
et al.’s (2010) study. Hope et al. (2013) use a variety of earnings quality measures which show
that public companies have higher earnings quality. However, when the tests are focussed
on areas where companies are more likely to have managed earnings, they find that the
superior earnings quality of public companies disappears.
3.3 Regime switching and audit exemption
We have not been able to identify research which directly examines the consequences of
switching between different regimes in the UK. However, the issue is an example of a
general concern of whether managers use accounting discretion to inform stakeholders or to
behave opportunistically. Recent evidence here is based on the US experience and is mixed.
For example, despite predictions that managerial discretion in determining goodwill
write-offs would be used to convey private information on future cash flows, Ramanna and
Watts (2012) and Li and Sloan (2015) find no evidence for this. In contrast, Hanley and
Hoberg (2012) find that greater disclosure before an initial public offering is informative
and results in more accurate offer pricing. This is particularly relevant to our study since
private companies may attempt to improve the quality of reporting by switching to IFRS in
anticipation of a public listing. However, Daske et al. (2013) distinguish between “label”
and “serious” adopters of IFRS, and it is only the latter type of companies which benefit.
From all the above evidence, it is difficult to predict the effect of switching within the UK
multi-tier regime.
On the issue of audit exemption, Dedman and Kausar (2012) analyse the behaviour of the
companies which became exempt in 2004. They find that those opting out of the audit had
higher levels of discretionary accruals in the following year, leading to an upward shift in
reported profit. However, the sample is very small (some 4,873 companies) and the
coefficients, although statistically significant, are, in economic terms, extremely small.
Furthermore, the companies they investigate are at the larger end of the small/micro
company spectrum, since they became eligible for audit exemption only due to changes in
the threshold. Therefore, the sample is unlikely to be representative of the population of
companies which do not opt for an audit.
3.4 Research questions
Overall, the research on the effect of the UK multi-tier structure of reporting is limited.
International evidence is mixed. Even where it is based on UK companies, it is dated and
therefore does not reflect the current environment in which exemptions for some classes of
company are substantial. Furthermore, very small companies, which constitute the vast
majority, are excluded from the analysis. The study of the impact of audit exemption in the
UK is similarly biased against very small companies. There is no direct evidence on the
ability of private companies to switch between regimes. However, it is an illustration of the
more general issue of whether managers use accounting discretion to inform stakeholders or
to behave opportunistically; the evidence here is mixed.
In view of the lack of clear implications either from prior research or from the statements







































UK regulatory framework. These questions are addressed within the reporting structure in
which listed companies applied IFRS, large private and medium-sized companies applied
UK GAAP, and small and micro companies applied the FRSSE. Although there have been
recent changes in the standards for private companies[3], it will be some time before a large
enough data set is available based on these requirements.
The first question relates to the regimes under which the different classes of company
were expected to report:
RQ1. Did the structure of UK financial reporting (in which listed companies reported
under IFRS, large private and medium-sized companies reported under UK GAAP,
small and micro companies reported under the FRSSE) give rise to variations in
earnings quality?
The second question concerns the option for non-listed companies to switch between these
reporting regimes.
RQ2. Did the regulations which allowed large private and medium-sized companies to
switch to IFRS from UK GAAP (and back again), and which allowed small and
micro companies to switch to IFRS or UK GAAP (and back again) result in an
improvement, a reduction or no change in earnings quality?
The third question is associated with the option for small and micro companies to present
unaudited accounts.
RQ3. Did the regulations which allowed small and micro companies to report unaudited
accounts give rise to changes in earnings quality?
4. Research design and data used
4.1 Measuring the smoothness of earnings
We use earnings quality to assess the impact of the multi-tier reporting regime. Our measure
of earnings quality is the smoothness of earnings and is based on Lang et al. (2003) and
Barth et al. (2008). Standard setters adopt accruals accounting since the volatility of cash
flow may mask underlying performance. However, accruals are not desirable if they smooth
out the underlying performance itself (Dechow et al., 2010). A common perception is that
smooth earnings are appreciated by investors, and even that smooth earnings can reduce
the cost of capital (Francis et al., 2004); however, more recent evidence argues that this
conclusion is unreliable, due to errors in measuring the cost of capital (McInnis, 2010).
Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, earnings management is likely to decrease a
stock’s liquidity, and thereby increase the cost of capital (Ascioglu et al., 2012).
There is consistent evidence that smoothing is negatively related to earnings quality.
In particular, Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) suggest that timely recognition of gains
and losses tends to increase the volatility of earnings relative to cash flows. Ewert and
Wagenhofer (2005, 2011) show that accounting standards that limit opportunistic
discretion should result in a higher variability of reported earnings; and Khalil and Simon
(2014) find that smoothness is positively related to discretionary accruals. Furthermore,
the lack of smoothness is important since the ability of the reporting process to indicate
change is a function which is valued by investors (see Barker and Imam, 2008, p. 321).
All this suggests that smoothness is an appropriate measure of earnings quality for this
study[4].
The smoothness of earnings is a firm-specific time series concept. However, there are
drawbacks to measuring smoothness at the firm level, primarily the selection bias arising
from the need to obtain a sufficient number of observations and the implied stability of the







































in earnings, which is then set in the context of other companies in a cross-section, controlling
for extraneous variables, following Lang et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2008). A preliminary
first step in identifying the smoothness of earnings in each group of companies is to mitigate
the effect of economic factors by regressing the change in annual net income scaled by total
assets on a number of control variables. The variance of the residuals from this regression
[V(ΔNI)] is then used as an estimate of the smoothness of earnings for the group. A smaller
V(ΔNI) is an indication of earnings smoothness. Specifically, we run the following
regression for each group to examine earnings smoothness:
DNIi;t ¼ a0þa1Sizei;tþa2Growthi;tþa3Levi;tþa4Dissuei;tþa5Turni;tþa6CFi;tþni;t (1)
where ΔNI is the change in net income scaled by total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of
end-of-year value of equity; Growth is the percentage change in sales; Lev is the end-of-year
total liabilities divided by end-of-year equity book value; Dissue is the percentage change in
total liabilities; Turn is sales divided by end-of-year total assets; and CF is the cash
flow from operating activities divided by end-of-year total assets; i takes values in the range
1, …, nt; and t takes values in the range 2006, 2007, …, 2013. Following the study of
Dechow (1994) and Hope et al. (2013), and taking note of there being no requirement for a
cash flow statement to be prepared by SMEs, we define the cash flows from operations as
CFO¼E +Dep −WCA, where CFO is cash flow from operation for the year; E is profit after
tax and extraordinary items for the year; Dep is depreciation (amortisation) for the year; and
WCA is working capital accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus
the change in current liabilities other than short-term debt and taxes payable.
A potential weakness of the V(ΔNI) measure is the way in which it controls for the
economic factors which may affect the smoothness of earnings. Although the variables are
firm specific, the coefficients of the model are estimated across the entire sample. This
procedure is, therefore, unlikely to eliminate all the economic components of smoothness
which operate at the firm level; consequently, the regression residual is likely to contain both
firm-specific economic as well as accounting factors which affect smoothness. Our test
mitigates this confounding of economic and accounting factors, and is again based on Lang
et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2008). We compare the smoothness of the change in net income,
V(ΔNI) from Equation (1), with the smoothness of the change in cash flow from operations,
which is estimated in a similar way to the smoothness of earnings equation[5], but withΔCF
as the dependent variable, as follows:
DCFi;t ¼ a0þa1Sizei;tþa2Growthi;tþa3Levi;tþa4Dissuei;tþa5Turni;tþa6CFi;tþni;t (2)
where ΔCF is the change in cash from operations scaled by total assets. We obtain the
variance of residual from Equation (2), [V(ΔCF)], as the smoothness of cash flows from
operation and combine it with the variance of the residual from Equation (1) [V(ΔNI)] to
construct the ratio V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF). The intuition behind this is that the term V(ΔCF), like
V(ΔNI), will contain the firm-specific economic components of cash flow smoothness, since
the parameter values are estimated across the sample as before; however, V(ΔCF) is less
likely to contain accounting components of earnings smoothing[6]. Taking the ratio of
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) attempts to scale out the firm-specific economic components of earnings
smoothing, leaving those that relate to accounting methods. A smaller ratio is an
indication of smoother earnings.
In order to compare the differences in earnings variability between each group of companies,
following Barth et al. (2008), we estimate the standard error of the ratio V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) by
a bootstrap procedure as follows. From the original sample, we randomly select (with
replacement) a new sample of the same size as the original sample, and estimate Equations (1)







































standard deviation of the estimated sampling distribution, and hence, the standard error of the
test statistic which approximates to a normal distribution. The standard deviation and mean of
each distribution are reported in the tables[7].
4.2 The control for self-selection bias in medium-sized, small and micro companies
Medium-sized, small companies and micro companies may submit abbreviated accounts,
with no income statement and cash flow statement. In these cases, we are not able to
estimate their earnings quality. However, a number of these companies voluntarily report
their income statement and, therefore, presumably not randomly. Since we want to examine
earnings quality for these observations, we have to control for the self-selection bias. We do
this (Givoly et al., 2010; Szczesny and Valentincic, 2013) by including an inverse Mills ratio
as an independent control variable in our earnings quality test. The variables which are
expected to affect the probability that the companies will produce a full set of accounts are
size and the existence of debt. Larger companies have less to fear from strategic aspects of
the business being understood from the income statement; and as debt increases, banks are
more likely to require an income statement for setting debt covenants. In order to obtain the
inverse Mills ratio, we model the probability of existence of the profit and loss statement by
running a probit regression on lagged total assets (TAt−1) and lagged debt to asset ratio
(DAt−1). The variable Pr (P/L statement) takes a value of 1 if the company has voluntarily
provided a profit and loss account, and 0 otherwise. We assume that the decision to produce
an income statement is made in the period immediately preceding the current period.
The estimated probit model is:
Pr P=L statement
  ¼ b0þb1TAt1þb2DAt1þe (3)
We then modify our Equations (1) and (2) for medium-sized, small and micro companies by






4.3 The effects of switching and audit exemption
In order to estimate the effects of switching, we identify companies switching between UK
GAAP and IFRS[8] during the sample period, and examine the earnings quality for the
identified companies across different classes of companies. We examine the quality of
earnings in the year of the switch by measuring the differences in earnings smoothness
between the groups; as before we use Equations (1) and (2) for listed and large private
companies, and Equations (4) and (5) for medium-sized, small and micro companies.
The audit exemption thresholds for small companies are currently aligned with
accounting thresholds. Therefore, in order to examine the effect of audit exemption on
earnings quality, we divide both the small and the micro companies samples into two
groups: companies with audited accounts and companies with unaudited accounts. We then
apply our earnings smoothness tests to compare companies with audited accounts and







































4.4 Data and sample selection
The main data applied in this paper are obtained from the “Financial Analysis Made
Easy” (FAME) database supplied by Bureau Van Dijk, a common source of data for work
in this area (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Dedman and Kausar, 2012; Dedman et al., 2014;
Collis, 2012).
In the UK, sections 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 define private companies as
small or medium for the purpose of accounting requirements. A micro company[9] is one
that satisfies at least two of the following criteria: a turnover of not more than £632,000; a
balance sheet total of not more than £316,000; and a maximum of 10 employees. A small
company is one that satisfies at least two of the following criteria: a turnover of not more
than £6.5 million; a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million; and a maximum of
50 employees. A medium-sized company is one that is not classified as small and satisfies at
least two of following criteria: a turnover of not more than £25.9 million; a balance sheet
total of not more than £12.9 million; and a maximum of 250 employees. A large private
company is one that is too large to be medium sized and is not listed. Our sample consists of
listed companies together with all of the above company categories.
We document the sample selection procedure in Table I. We obtain companies that have
available data between 2006 and 2013[10], selecting publicly listed and private companies
Panel A: sample selection from FAME
All active firms in the FAME database with listing status information 3,131,051
Less subsidiaries companies 259,447
Less financial services firms 7,912
Less firms with qualified accounts 2,059
Less firms without a value of total assets in any year, 2006-2013 2,114,134
Initial sample – no. of firms 747,499














Initial sample – no. of firms 1,419 3,448 9,023 403,693 329,916 747,499
Less: firms filing abbreviated Accounts
(Pr¼ 0) N/A N/A (764) (285,639) (246,429) (532,832)
Less: firms with missing data (290) (693) (2,220) (39,862) (27,870) (70,935)
No. of firms used in Equations (1) and (2) 1,129 2,755 6,039 78,192 55,617 143,732
No. of firm-years used in Equations (1)
and (2) 6,318 13,067 20,630 256,562 217,647 514,224














No. of firms used in Equations (1) and (2) 1,129 2,755 6,039 78,192 55,617 143,732
Firms not switching accounting standards 977 2,686 5,999 78,088 55,617 143,367
Firms which followed IFRS 977 132 56 111 0 1,276
Firms which followed GAAP 0 2,554 5,943 77,977 55,617 142,091
Firms switching accounting standards 152 69 40 104 0 365
Instances of switching from GAAP to IFRS 152 65 37 78 0
Instances of switching from IFRS to GAAP 0 32 19 68 0
Notes: All observations are observed during the sample period, 2006-2013. The instances of switching from
GAAP to IFRS plus the instances of switching from IFRS to GAAP may not add up to the number of firms
switching accounting standards due to firms having multiple switches during the sample period.









































based on their listing status in the FAME classification. The period 2006-2013 is chosen
since this includes a period in which the UK economy was weak following the collapse in
2007 (ONS, 2014); the year 2006 is included for comparison. In order to inform future policy,
it is important to focus on such periods during which comparability issues may arise due to
large one-off items and also earnings management to obscure poor performance. We exclude
banks, other financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6799) and also companies without a
known value of total assets between 2006 and 2013 in order to mitigate data errors. We also
exclude companies with qualified accounts during the sample period because they are likely
to have different reporting incentives. Our initial sample has 747,499 companies. However,
due to the lack of companies’ data to compute earnings quality measures, the resulting
sample is reduced to 514,224 firm-year observations, comprising of 6,318 for listed
companies, 13,067 for large private companies, 20,630 for medium-sized companies, 256,562
for small companies and 217,647 for micro companies.
Table II (panels A-E) gives the summary statistics of the accounting variables used in the
study. We note that total assets and total sales are more varied for listed companies than for
private companies; also, large private companies are more varied in size than the other
private groups. Turning to our testing variables, we observe that the standard deviations of
ΔNI and ΔCF are larger for small and micro companies than for large private and medium-
sized companies. This suggests that small and micro companies are unlikely to have a
higher level of earnings smoothness than others. Furthermore, small and micro companies
have negative growth, suggesting that smaller companies are struggling during the period
of downturn; they also have higher leverage indicating that they have a greater reliance on
debt to finance the business.
5. Results and analysis
5.1 The smoothness of earnings
Table III presents results of the smoothness of earnings tests for the sample period
2006-2013[11]. For the V(ΔNI) measure, small and micro companies have higher values
than other firms (0.1132 for small companies, 0.1707 for micro companies), which suggests
that sample wide parameters do not eliminate all the firm-specific economic variability.
This is consistent with small and micro companies covering a wide spectrum of economic
operations. After scaling by cash flow variability, the V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) measure is
largest for listed companies (0.3313) closely followed by small and micro companies,
0.2485 and 0.2231, respectively. The earnings of large private and medium-sized
companies are much smoother with relatively low values of 0.0587 and 0.0695,
respectively. We give the standard deviation of the bootstrap distribution as an estimate
of the standard error, and the mean for comparison with the sample statistic; the
differences discussed above are statistically significant and are also found when we
disaggregate across the sample years.
Overall, these results indicate that IFRS is effective in constraining the incentives for
earnings management which exist in listed companies. The quality of earnings in small and
micro companies is nearly as informative as in listed companies, suggesting that the
strategy of giving reporting exemptions to small and micro companies has not lowered
earnings quality. In contrast, the earnings of large private and medium-sized companies are
significantly smoother, suggesting that their reported performance may not be comparable
with that of listed, small and micro companies.
5.2 The effect of switching between regimes
In our second test, we rerun the earnings smoothness tests to examine the effect of switching














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regimes during the sample period 2006-2013. For comparison, panels A, A(1) and A(2)
report the results for companies which did not change regime, and is consistent with
Table III; that is, large private and medium-sized companies appear to have a lower quality
of earnings than other groups. In addition, panel A(1) shows that following IFRS does
not guarantee earnings quality since there is variation across the different types of
companies; these results are similar to Kvaal and Nobes (2012) who document the variation
in accounting practice across European countries, even though they are all
following IFRS.
Table IV panel B gives the results for companies which switched from UK GAAP to
IFRS. Since IFRS was compulsory for listed companies for accounting periods commencing
1 January 2005, the 152 observations identified for listed companies are presumably those
which became listed during the sample period. Table IV panel B also shows that the large
private companies which voluntarily switched to IFRS improved their earnings quality very
slightly, since they have a smoothing measure of 0.0722 compared with 0.0537 for those
which followed UK GAAP, as shown in panel A(2). It is possible that these large private
companies may have been considering listed status and, thus, improved their reporting
quality to gain more accurate offer pricing in the future, as found by Hanley and Hoberg












All years No. of firm-years 6,318 13,067 20,630 256,562 217,647


























2006 No. of firms 768 1,367 1,970 34,087 38,136
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.3199 0.0589 0.0783 0.2474 0.2325
2007 No. of firms 780 1,442 2,180 33,642 39,508
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.3979 0.0579 0.0715 0.2519 0.2285
2008 No. of firms 780 1,575 2,249 32,945 40,240
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.3857 0.0771 0.0851 0.2461 0.2266
2009 No. of firms 805 1,611 2,608 32,045 33,629
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.3620 0.0606 0.0802 0.2500 0.2088
2010 No. of firms 790 1,733 2,842 31,662 18,114
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2088 0.0417 0.0549 0.2497 0.2198
2011 No. of firms 807 1,744 2,984 30,941 19,686
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.3935 0.0649 0.0672 0.2458 0.2257
2012 No. of firms 794 1,793 2,958 30,698 15,335
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.4001 0.0594 0.0762 0.2455 0.2315
2013 No. of firms 794 1,802 2,839 30,542 12,999
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.3789 0.0595 0.0730 0.2448 0.2232
Notes: V(ΔNI) is the variability of earnings, which is measured by the variance of the residuals from
Equations (1) and (4) to capture the smoothness of earnings; V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) is the ratio of variability of
earnings to the variability of cash flows from operating activities, where the variability of earnings is
measured by the variance of the residuals from Equations (1) and (4), and the variability of cash flows is
measured by the variance of the residuals from Equations (2) and (5). This ratio is to capture the smoothness
of earnings related to the smoothness of cash flows. We report, in parenthesis, the means and standard
deviations of the bootstrapped variance of residuals [V(ΔNI)] and the ratio [V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF)]. The standard
deviation of the bootstrap distribution is our estimate of the standard error of the test statistic which











































smoother earnings than those companies which followed UK GAAP during the period; small
companies have a smoothing value of 0.1605 compared with 0.2487 in panel A(2), whilst
medium-sized companies have a smoothing value of 0.0178 compared with 0.0718 in panel
A(2). This is suggestive of a situation in which companies switch to IFRS without any
accompanying improvement in reporting quality.
Table IV panel C shows that all the private companies (small, medium-sized and large)
which switched back from IFRS to UKGAAP have more earnings smoothing than those which
remained with UK GAAP, as shown in panel A(2). The overall conclusion about switching is
that, with the exception of large private companies which slightly reduced smoothing by
switching to IFRS (perhaps in anticipation of an initial public offering), the evidence from both












Panel A: observations where there is no change accounting standards during the sample period
No. of firm-years 5,466 12,725 20,500 256,142 217,647













Panel A (1): observations for companies which followed IFRS during the sample period
No. of firm-years 5,466 651 182 531 –












Panel A (2): observations for companies which followed UK GAAP during the sample period
No. of firm-years – 12,074 20,318 255,611 217,647











Panel B: observations for companies which changed accounting standards from UK GAAP to IFRS during the
sample period
No. of firm-years 152 65 37 78 –












Panel C: observations for companies which changed accounting standards from IFRS to UK GAAP during the
sample period
No. of firm-years – 32 19 68 –










Notes: V(ΔNI) is the variability of earnings, which is measured by the variance of the residuals from
Equations (1) and (4) to capture the smoothness of earnings; V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) is the ratio of variability of
earnings to the variability of cash flows from operating activities, where the variability of earnings is
measured by the variance of the residuals from Equations (1) and (4), and the variability of cash flows is
measured by the variance of the residuals from Equations (2) and (5). This ratio is to capture the smoothness
of earnings related to the smoothness of cash flows. We report, in parenthesis, the means and standard
deviations of the bootstrapped variance of residuals [V(ΔNI)] and the ratio [V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF)]. The standard
deviation of the bootstrap distribution is our estimate of the standard error of the test statistic which
approximates to a normal distribution. Variables in panel A are measured during the sample period,













































5.3 The effect of audit exemption
Table V presents the effect of audit exemption on earnings quality. A feature of the results is
that the trend away from audit, documented by Dedman et al. (2014) for the years 2003-2006,
continues. For small companies, in 2006, there were 17,245 companies which had an audit
compared with 16,842 which did not; by 2013, the numbers were 2,907 and 27,635,
respectively. The story for micro companies is similar. These numbers also document the
decline of both small and micro companies during the recession.
With respect to small companies, for all years combined, the V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) measure in
Table V shows that audited accounts have much the same earnings smoothness (0.2472) as
small company non-audited accounts (0.2491). This finding is along similar lines to those of
vanTendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008), who, in a European study of private companies
1998-2002, find that earnings smoothing in the UK does not vary much between Big 4 and non-
Big 4 audited companies. However, we find that, in recent years, small company audited
accounts are slightly smoother than non-audited accounts; for example, in 2011, the smoothness
measure was 0.2170 compared with 0.2475 for non-audited accounts, which suggests that the
disciplining effect of audit on earnings quality was slightly weakened after the recession period.
Table V also shows the results for micro companies. For all years combined, audited
micro companies appear to have similar earnings quality to unaudited micro companies;










All Years No. of firm-years 75,976 180,586 72,111 145,536
V(ΔNI) 0.0996 0.1193 0.1692 0.1715
Mean, SD of
bootstrap distribn
(0.1067, 2.63E-04) (0.1154, 1.59E-04) (0.1691, 3.67E-04) (0.1714, 2.70E-04)
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2472 0.2491 0.2278 0.2211
Mean, SD of
bootstrap distribn
(0.2507, 8.68E-04) (0.2478, 5.16E-04) (0.2279, 7.53E-04) (0.2211, 4.85E-04)
2006 No. of firms 17,245 16,842 18,209 20,272
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2527 0.2429 0.2364 0.2278
2007 No. of firms 16,706 16,936 18,587 20,806
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2464 0.2566 0.2331 0.2252
2008 No. of firms 15,654 17,291 19,136 20,989
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2490 0.2433 0.2280 0.2254
2009 No. of firms 13,047 18,998 13,304 20,210
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2456 0.2520 0.2127 0.2062
2010 No. of firms 3,835 27,827 941 17,173
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2353 0.2504 0.2204 0.2196
2011 No. of firms 3,370 27,571 728 18,958
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2170 0.2475 0.2611 0.2257
2012 No. of firms 3,212 27,486 627 14,708
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.1897 0.2501 0.2744 0.2317
2013 No. of firms 2,907 27,635 579 12,420
V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) 0.2293 0.2463 0.3470 0.2203
Notes: V(ΔNI) is the variability of earnings, which is measured by the variance of the residuals from
Equations (1) and (4) to capture the smoothness of earnings; V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) is the ratio of variability of
earnings to the variability of cash flows from operating activities, where the variability of earnings is
measured by the variance of the residuals from Equations (1) and (4), and the variability of cash flows is
measured by the variance of the residuals from Equations (2) and (5). This ratio is to capture the smoothness
of earnings related to the smoothness of cash flows. We report, in parenthesis, the means and standard
deviations of the bootstrapped variance of residuals [V(ΔNI)] and the ratio [V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF)]. The standard
deviation of the bootstrap distribution is our estimate of the standard error of the test statistic which
approximates to a normal distribution. All variables are measured during the sample period, 2006-2013
Table V.










































the V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) measure is similar for both groups (0.2278 and 0.2211, respectively). At
the individual year level, there is evidence that the audit improves earnings quality. For
2011-2013, the V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) measure is larger for audited accounts than for unaudited
accounts; the greatest difference is in 2013, when for a small number of companies (579), the
ratio was 0.3470 compared with 0.2203 for non-audited accounts. Although the explanation
for this is beyond the current paper, it is noteworthy that the period is one in which the
number of micro companies is declining. It may be that in this context, some micro
companies were in need of finance from banks, which require good-quality financial
information, including an audit.
6. Conclusions
Since the Companies Act 1981, there has emerged a multi-tier framework for financial
reporting in the UK. This development was extended by the 2013 Accounting Directive from
the EU, which has the objective of reducing disproportionate costs imposed on smaller
companies. An important issue which arises from this multi-tier approach is how the quality
of reporting is affected.
UK regulation itself offers no guidance on this question and the existing research is both
limited and dated. In particular, the studies exclude very small andmicro companies which are
the focus of the 2013 EU directive, requiring the reporting burden to be reduced for this group.
We address this gap in the literature and review the quality of earnings between the different
types of company from 2006 to 2013. We classify companies according to whether they are
listed, large private, medium-sized, small or micro. The inclusion of very small and micro
companies leads to a large sample of over 514,000 company-year observations. Earnings
quality is measured by its lack of smoothness, which is a general measure and recognised to
reflect the quality of accounting standards and the needs of stakeholders.
We find that the earnings of listed companies have the highest quality reflecting the
success of IFRS in restraining the well-recognised incentives for earnings management. This
is closely followed by small and micro companies. In contrast, the smoothing behaviour of
large private and medium-sized companies is approximately six times as large as listed
companies and four times as large as small and micro companies. This finding is consistent
with opportunistic behaviour undertaken by large private and medium-sized companies
having transactions for which there is more discretion under UK GAAP than under IFRS.
A feature of UK standards is that non-listed companies are allowed to report under a
regime intended for larger companies; for example, medium-sized companies may report
using IFRS instead of UK GAAP. We find that the number of companies which switch
regimes is small. Large private companies which switched to IFRS have improved earnings
quality; they may have been considering listed status and, thus, improved their reporting
quality to gain more accurate offer pricing in the future. Switching by other private
companies suggests opportunism. Medium-sized companies that switch regime, whether
from or back to the home regime, have the poorest earnings quality of all medium-sized
companies. Similarly, small companies which remain in their home regime and follow UK
GAAP have a higher earnings quality than other small companies.
Another flexibility, allowed only to small and micro companies, is to be exempt from
audit. We assess whether exercising this option leads to a decline in quality. Overall, the
results indicate that earnings quality is much the same for both audited and unaudited
financial statements, suggesting that small and micro companies act in the best interests of
their stakeholders even when they are not under the audit spotlight. However, we also find
some indication, for the more recent 2011-2013 period, that micro companies which choose
an audit have a higher earnings quality than those which do not. We do not investigate the
cause of this, but perhaps it is related to the increased demand by micro companies for bank







































Two reservations are in order. First, we have not been able to measure the impact of the
option for micro-, small- andmedium-sized companies to submit abbreviated accounts since we
assess companies according to their earnings quality and the companies involved do not file an
income statement. From a policy viewpoint, this limitation may not be too critical since the
option is likely to be exercised less frequently when, from 2016, shareholder approval is
required every year. Second, our analysis is based on reporting requirements prior to the
recently issued FRS 102/FRS 105 for medium sized, small and micro companies. However, it
will be some time before suitable data are available based on those standards. Therefore, given
the stability of our results over time and the very limited evidence to date, we believe that this
study gives some worthwhile insight into answering the question of whether the directive is a
“sensible reduction in red tape or a source of risk to the UK economy” (ICAEW, 2015). Overall,
our results, based on past evidence, show that it is possible to reduce the reporting burden on
small and micro companies without compromising the quality of reporting.
Notes
1. These large- and medium-sized companies, as well as small companies, were also permitted to
report under IFRS if they so wished. However, the Companies Act 2006, s395 and s403 placed
restrictions on switching back to the home regime, but these were subsequently relaxed to allow
companies to switch back within a five year period.
2. The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) was the chief regulatory body for accounting standards
in the UK prior to the reorganisation in July 2012 when it was superseded by the Financial
Reporting Council (FRC).
3. Large private and medium-sized companies are intended to report under FRS 102 (effective from
1 January 2015), small companies under a special section of FRS 102 and micro companies under
FRS 105 (effective from 1 January 2016).
4. In common with studies in this area, we concentrate on recognition rather than disclosure, since
research (e.g. Schipper, 2007) suggests that disclosure does not compensate for inadequate recognition.
5. As in Barth et al. (2008), the values of the variables below the 5th percentile and above the 95th
level are winsorized to mitigate the influence of outliers.
6. However, to the extent that the control variables are inadequately measured by the accounting
system, V(ΔCF ) may still be contaminated by accounting factors.
7. We also report the statistics for V(ΔNI) which are constructed in a similar way.
8. The FAME database: we use records only whether a company follows UK GAAP or IFRS, and
not whether the FRSEE is adopted within UK GAAP.
9. The Companies Act 2006 was amended by statutory instrument, SI, 3008, The Small Companies
(Micro Entities’ Accounts) Regulations 2013.
10. We also need prior year data to calculate changes in working capital, but this is not part of our
sample period for the smoothing tests.
11. Of note is the fact that earnings quality for 2006 and 2007 is similar for all types of company,
suggesting that the V(ΔNI)/V(ΔCF) measure is able to eliminate volatility due to the recession
which commenced in 2007.
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